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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices encroach on almost every part of our lives, including
work and leisure, and contain a wealth of personal and sensitive
information. It is, therefore, imperative that these devices uphold
high security standards. A key aspect is the security of the underly-
ing operating system. In particular, Android plays a critical role due
to being the most dominant platform in the mobile ecosystem with
more than one billion active devices and due to its openness, which
allows vendors to adopt and customize it. Similar to other plat-
forms, Android maintains security by providing monthly security
patches and announcing them via the Android security bulletin. To
absorb this information successfully across the Android ecosystem,
impeccable coordination by many different vendors is required.
In this paper, we perform a comprehensive study of 3,171Android-
related vulnerabilities and study to which degree they are reflected
in the Android security bulletin, as well as in the security bulletins
of three leading vendors: Samsung, LG, and Huawei. In our analysis,
we focus on the metadata of these security bulletins (e.g., timing,
affected layers, severity, and CWE data) to better understand the
similarities and differences among vendors. We find that (i) the
studied vendors in the Android ecosystem have adopted different
structures for vulnerability reporting, (ii) vendors are less likely to
react with delay for CVEs with Android Git repository references,
(iii) vendors handle Qualcomm-related CVEs differently from the
rest of external layer CVEs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, smartphones are an indispensable part of our lives, and
they are supersaturated with sensitive and personal information. As
a result, high levels of security are crucial in the smartphone ecosys-
tem. Android is the dominant operating system (OS) in the smart-
phone ecosystem with more than one billion active devices [20].
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Android is released under an open-source license by the Android
Open Source Project (AOSP). Due to the openness of the platform,
many vendors and carriers adopted Android as their underlying
platform.Within the Android ecosystem, Samsung, LG, and Huawei
play important roles. In September 2019, Samsung’s market share
was 31.2% of mobile devices worldwide, while Huawei’s and LG’s
market shares were 10.0% and 2.5%, respectively [32].
Since August 2015, AOSP maintains the security of the Android
platform by providing monthly security patches and publishing
the details of each patch in the Android security bulletin [2]. Other
vendors like Samsung [29], LG [21], and Huawei [17] subsequently
also launched their own security bulletins.
In practice, when a vulnerability is found, disclosed, and patched,
one can find the relevant information in a vulnerability database,
the Android security bulletin, or a vendor’s security bulletin. How-
ever, due to customization and differences in hardware, a vulner-
ability in Android is not necessarily applicable to all vendors and
devices [1, 13, 36]. Therefore, one has to search for a vulnerability
in a vendor’s security bulletin to determine whether it is applica-
ble to a vendor’s device. However, even if a vendor has a security
bulletin, it is possible that a vulnerability has not been mentioned
in the bulletin yet, but it may appear later. Misinformation or de-
lays in different vendors’ security bulletins could mislead security
practitioners. Moreover, the absence of relevant information in a
vendor’s security bulletin is an important indicator that millions of
smartphones may be unpatched and vulnerable.
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we perform the first
comprehensive study of how vendors handle Android-related vul-
nerabilities in their security bulletins. We collect a total of 3,171
unique CVEs from Android, Samsung, LG, and Huawei security
bulletins, as well as further data from Google Git repositories, and
CVEDetails, which provides detailed information for each vulnera-
bility. Thereby, we focus on the four vendors that regularly publish
security bulletins. We shed light on the security practices in the
broader Android ecosystem and, specifically, how vendors handle
Android-related vulnerabilities. In summary, our paper makes the
following key contributions:
• We show that each vendor adopted a different approach for
announcing CVEs in its security bulletins. Samsung is the
only vendor mentioning CVEs that are not applicable to its
devices. Therefore, the majority of CVEs originating from
Android security bulletins appeared in Samsung’s bulletins
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(99.55%). In contrast, for LG and Huawei, the ratio of ex-
plicitly mentioned vulnerabilities is only 78.16% and 52.61%,
respectively, creating significant uncertainty.
• In terms of delay between Android security bulletins and a
vendor’s security bulletins, we find that Huawei does not
have any time differences for 97.0% of its CVEs. In contrast,
Samsung and LG do not have any time difference for only
44.7% and 39.44% of their CVEs, respectively.
• Wefind that there is no delay for almost all CVEs that have an
AOSP Git repository reference in Android security bulletins,
which is true for all vendors.
• Time differences among vendors appear mostly for CVEs
of the external and kernel Android OS layers. Moreover,
with respect to the average delay in the external layer, we
find that Samsung and LG handle Qualcomm-related CVEs
with longer delay than the rest of the external layer CVEs.
In contrast, for Huawei the average delay for Qualcomm-
related CVEs is lower than the rest of external layer CVEs.
2 DATA COLLECTION
Since each vendor publishes its vulnerability patches in its own
security bulletin, each of them has its unique format and set of fields
for describing vulnerabilities. Moreover, none of these vendors
provide data in a standard, machine-readable format, such as JSON
or XML. Therefore, we built a designated crawler and content parser
for each vendor. To crawl the vendors’ websites, we used Selenium
Browser Automation [30]. We collected data until August 2019.
Android and Huawei security bulletins include only CVEs, while
Samsung and LG security bulletins contain not only CVEs but
also their unique vulnerability identifiers: LG Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (LVE) and Samsung Vulnerabilities and Exposures (SVE).
On Android security bulletins, we scraped all CVEs from August
2015 (i.e., first published bulletin) until August 2019. Early versions
of the Android security bulletin have different field names than the
most recent version. For instance, the field Updated AOSP Versions
has different names, such as Affected Versions in August 2015 [3]
and Updated Versions in December 2015 [4]. As a result, we needed
different crawlers and content parsers even for a specific vendor’s
security bulletins.
CVEs on Android security bulletins might also contain a field
called References linking to the Android AOSP Git Repository [15],
which shows all of the commit details. When a vulnerability patch
has a reference field, we also scraped the commit details of that
particular vulnerability patch.
We scraped LG and Samsung CVEs beginning from the start date
of their security bulletins, May 2016 and October 2015, respectively.
On Huawei, however, there are two different security bulletins;
we scraped both. The first one appears as Huawei EMUI/Magic UI
security updates, which started in December 2017 [18]. The second
one is called Security Advisories [19], which started in 2012. On
these security advisories, there are also CVE IDs that reference
the particular security advisory. However, not all of these security
advisories are accompanied by the corresponding CVE. In total,
817 unique CVEs have been mentioned in these security advisories
and only two of them are common with the first Huawei bulletins.
Moreover, if we consider the official start date of Huawei security
bulletins in December 2017, Huawei security advisory has only 6
common CVEs with the Android security bulletins, which does not
impact our results. Here, we mainly focus on the difference between
Android security bulletins and a vendor’s security bulletin. Hence,
we do not consider the Huawei security advisory in our analysis.
Aside from these security bulletins, we also scraped CVEDe-
tails [28] to gain additional attributes of the vulnerabilities. After
scraping all of these vulnerabilities, we converted them to a com-
mon JSON [35] format and stored them in MongoDB [25]. Figure 1
shows the overall data collection process described above.1
Figure 1: Data scraping schema.
Limitations: Our work has the following limitations. First, we
focus only on Android security bulletins and on the three Android
vendors that, to our knowledge, have established comprehensive
security bulletins. Second, for each vendor, our analysis is limited to
the time since the vendor started publishing its security bulletins.
We cannot claim our results are valid from the Android commercial-
ization date (i.e., 2008) til the start of a vendor’s security bulletins.
But, our analysis is representative of the current ecosystem rather
than the past. Third, the available information for each CVE varies.
As an example, for some CVEs, we have a reference link; but for
some, we do not have any. We use this type of information plus
component and category names in Android security bulletins to
perform our Android stack layer analysis. Hence, our analysis for
Android stack layers is limited to those CVEs for which we have
the corresponding information. Fourth, we are aware that many
other factors can affect how a vendor manages its security bulletins
or how a vendor mentions and describes them. In our analysis, we
limit ourselves to only a vendor’s security bulletins and report what
we observe from these. As such, we defer code analysis to future
work, and instead focus on a high-level analysis of the security
bulletins.
3 RESULTS
Next, we analyze the data that we have collected to understand
how Android vendors manage their security bulletins.
3.1 Data Characterization
In total, we scraped 3,171 unique CVEs from the four different
vendors’ security bulletins (see Table 1).
3.2 Bulletin Management
Different vendors have adopted different approaches for handling
their security bulletins. LG announces CVEs with their correspond-
ing severity levels monthly. Huawei employs the same practice,
1The dataset is available at https://github.com/culture67/Android-Bulletin-Data
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(a) Samsung (b) LG (c) Huawei
Figure 2: Vendors’ management of security bulletins compared to Android.
Android Samsung LG Huawei
No. of CVEs 2,705 2,587 2,023 816
Unique to 202 157 12 31
Launch Date Aug. 2015 Oct. 2015 May 2016 Dec. 2017
Table 1: Number of CVEs and security-bulletin launch dates
for different vendors. Row “Unique to” shows the number
of CVEs that are mentioned only in that vendor’s security
bulletins.
but it also has a part for CVEs that are already included in previous
updates2 without mentioning the exact date of bulletin. In addition
to severity levels and already included CVEs, Samsung utilizes the
labels Not applicable to Samsung devices3 and in addition (which
only has been used by Samsung only once, in February 2018).
Figure 2 summarizes how these three vendors announce CVEs
in their security bulletins and includes a comparison to Android. In
this figure, for each month, we consider the CVEs that have been
announced on the Android security bulletin of that month. CVEs
mentioned in the bulletins with a severity level or in addition are
considered as Normal Mention. Already Included and N/A represent
CVEs mentioned in the already included part and not applicable
part of a vendor’s security bulletin, respectively. Not Mentioned
represents those CVEs that have not been mentioned at a vendor’s
security bulletin so far compared to the Android security bulletins.
According to Figure 2, Samsung has mentioned most of the CVEs
(99.55%), that previously appeared in the Android security bulletins,
which stands in contrast to LG and Huawei (78.16% and 52.61%,
respectively). As we can see in Figure 2a, there is a rise in not
mentioned CVEs in August 2019. One likely explanation is that
Samsung will announce them in the upcoming months beyond
the date we gathered our data. Moreover, in April 2018, there are
many CVEs that have not been mentioned in both LG and Huawei
contrary to Samsung. The reason leading to this is how Android
announces Qualcomm related CVEs. In that month, the Android
security bulletin had a section for 225 cumulative updates for Qual-
comm components to associate them with a patch level. These
CVEs were shared by Qualcomm with their partners between 2014
and 2016. Samsung mentioned all these CVEs two months earlier
in its security bulletin as in addition (the only time Samsung has
used this label so far).
2We use already included hereafter.
3We use N/A or not applicable hereafter.
Samsung started using the label not applicable in January 2016.
Now, there are 537 CVEs associated with this label. For example,
from the beginning of LG security bulletins, i.e., May 2016, Samsung
announced 527 CVEs with a not applicable label. From these 527,
265 have not been mentioned in the LG security bulletins so far.
From December 2017 (Huawei bulletin’s start date), there are 233
such CVEs and 159 of them have not been mentioned in Huawei’s
security bulletins, yet. Due to vendors’ customization practices,
it is expected that some CVEs are not applicable for all vendors.
Nonetheless, the difference is surprising. For Samsung, due to the
not applicable label, we have some assurance that these CVEs in-
deed are not relevant. But, for LG and Huawei, we are left with
a large degree of uncertainty. Therefore, a key reporting sugges-
tion is that all vendors should introduce a section or label for not
applicable CVEs (and references to their devices).
3.3 Time Comparison and Android Layers
We further investigated the timeline of normal mentions in these
vendors compared to Android (see Figure 3). Figure 3a represents
the absolute number of CVEs for each vendor’s security bulletin
with the corresponding time difference from the Android security
bulletin (CVEs appeared in a vendor’s security bulletins once). The
positive (negative) number means that a vendor is slower (faster)
than Android to mention a CVE in its security bulletins. Figure 3b
represents the ratio of the time difference. As we see in Figure 3,
Huawei does not have any time differences with Android for 97.03%
of CVEs compared to Samsung and LG, 44.73% and 39.44%, respec-
tively. LG mentions CVEs one month after the Android security
bulletin for 59.57% of its CVEs, while this number is 27.80% for
Samsung. For Samsung, there exists a considerable number of CVEs
that are mentioned in Samsung security bulletins two months ear-
lier than Android. Note that all these CVEs are those that have been
mentioned with the label in addition in February 2018.
It is useful to further break down vendors’ behaviors in terms
of Android stack layers to better understand the source of differ-
ences among vendors. To achieve that, we first need to find the
corresponding layer for a CVE since this information is not publicly
available in security bulletins. In doing so, we use three attributes
(which is discussed in detail in our previous work [12]), component
name (a column for some CVEs in Android security bulletins), cat-
egory name (in an Android security bulletin, CVEs appear under
specific category), and the combination of a branch path with the
changed file patch for CVEs that have an Android Git repository.
These three attributes are not available for all CVEs. As a result,
we can only find layer information for some CVEs and remove
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(a) Absolute Number (b) Ratio
Figure 3: Distribution of vendors’ time difference from An-
droid security bulletin.
the rest from our analysis. Only two CVEs relate to the Android
runtime layer. Therefore, we exclude them from our analysis. In
the following, we consider each layer separately.
External Layer. This layer has 1772 unique CVEs in total. Sam-
sung has 1761 (1216 Qualcomm-related) CVEs in the external layer
in which 80 and 5 of them have two or three mentions in the Sam-
sung security bulletins, respectively. The majority of CVEs with
N/A are in this layer (357 out of 537) and Samsung mentions them
within one month after the Android security bulletins. LG has 1213
(821 Qualcomm-related) unique CVEs and 21 of them are mentioned
twice. 291 unique CVEs (218 Qualcomm-related) belong to Huawei
and 10 of them are mentioned twice in Huawei security bulletins.
Contrary to Huawei, Samsung and LG are faster in announcing
non-Qualcomm CVEs in their security bulletins than Qualcomm-
related CVEs4 (see Table 2). The difference for Huawei is not signifi-
cant (Mann-Whitney test,p = 0.103), but the difference is significant
for both Samsung (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.0001) and LG (Mann-
Whitney test, p < 0.0001). We also perform an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) test for both Qualcomm-related CVEs (p < 0.0001) and
the rest of external layer CVEs (p < 0.0001). These show that the av-
erage delay for these three vendors is significantly different for both
Qualcomm-related CVEs and the rest of the external layer CVEs.
Qualcomm Rest of External Layer Application Layer
Samsung 1.753 0.837 0.571
LG 0.957 0.428 -0.0541
Huawei -0.0588 0.0152 0
Table 2: Average delay (in months) of CVEs in external layer
and application layer.
Application Layer.We find 50 unique CVEs in the application
layer. All of them are mentioned in Samsung, but 9 of them are
N/A to Samsung. 44 of them are mentioned once. LG mentioned 37
of them once in its security bulletins and only one of them twice.
Huawei mentioned 16 CVEs of this layer once. For both Samsung
and Huawei, there is no already included mention for this layer.
See application column of Table 2 for the average delay. LG and
Huawei do not introduce any delay for CVEs in this layer.
Application Framework Layer (AFL). There are 128 unique
CVEs in this layer. Samsung mentioned 126 of them. For LG and
4For this analysis and the rest, we only focus on normal CVEs with one mention. We
exclude already included CVEs since we do not know the exact time of the correspond-
ing bulletin. The reasons we do not consider multiple mentions are (i) it is not common
among vendors and (ii) it is not clear which delay we should consider.
Huawei, we have 108 and 41, respectively. The AFL column in
Table 3 shows the average delay of this layer.
AFL NL HAL Kernel
Samsung 0.241 0.0766 0.0515 1.296
LG 0.1373 0.139 0.0522 0.972
Huawei 0 0.811 0 0.0357
Table 3: Average delay (in months) of CVEs in application
framework, native, hardware abstraction, andKernel layers.
Native Library (NL). In Android, there are 266 unique CVEs.
247 of them are mentioned in the Samsung bulletins. LG has men-
tioned 191 of them and 45 of them are mentioned in Huawei so far.
Samsung has the lowest average delay in this layer compared to
other layers, i.e., 0.0766 months. On the other hand, Huawei has the
highest average delay for CVEs of this layer, i.e., 0.811 (see Table 3).
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL). In this layer, we find 146
unique CVEs. 145 of them are mentioned in Samsung. 137 of them
are mentioned in LG security bulletins and Huawei has mentioned
106 of them. For average delay, see Table 3.
Kernel Layer. We have 213 unique CVEs in the Kernel layer.
Samsung has mentioned 211 of them in its security bulletins in
which 43 of them are “not applicable” to Samsung devices. LG men-
tioned 186 of them and 40 of them are mentioned in Huawei. It is
the only layer in which other vendors have never been mentioning
any CVEs sooner than Android security bulletins. In other words,
there does not exist any negative delay for CVEs of this layer. We
also perform an ANOVA test on the delay of these three vendors
and the difference among them is significant (p < 0.00001).
We also compare the response time of two vendors in each layer
for common CVEs between them (see Table 4). In this table, each
entry represents the number of times a vendor is faster compared
to another one in announcing a CVE in its security bulletins and
the number in parenthesis shows the average difference in a month.
As an example,H < S means that Huawei is faster than Samsung in
announcing CVEs of a layer. As we can see in this table, Huawei is
rarely slower than Samsung and LG in all layers. This was expected
as we see Huawei mentions CVEs in its bulletins mostly without
delay (see Figure 3b). Furthermore, all three vendors treat CVEs
from all layers almost the same except External andKernel layers.
Huawei is faster than both Samsung and LG for 52.98% and 61.68%
of external layer CVEs, respectively. LG is faster than Samsung for
25.44% of the external layer’s CVEs. In other words, the external
layer CVEs in Samsung are rarely mentioned sooner than the cor-
responding CVEs in Huawei and LG security bulletins. For Kernel
layer CVEs, Huawei is almost always faster than both Samsung
and LG. LG is faster than Samsung for 23.33% of the CVEs. This
shows that vendors handle CVEs originating from Kernel and Exter-
nal layers differently in terms of announcements in their security
bulletins. Huawei is the fastest one, while Samsung is the slowest.
The above analysis also suggests that CVEs with external refer-
ences/repositories like Qualcomm and Kernel may introduce some
delay for vendors to announce these CVEs in their security bul-
letins. Further, in Android security bulletins, some CVEs have an
AOSP Git repository. Hence, we investigate whether vendors han-
dle CVEs with the AOSP Git repository differently in terms of a
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Vendor Huawei vs. Samsung LG vs. Huawei Samsung vs. LG
Layer H <S H = S H >S L <H L = H L >H S <L S = L S >L
External 71 (1.014) 62 1 (1) 2 (1) 62 103 (1.097) 29 (1) 610 218 (2.95)
Application 0 14 0 0 15 0 0 29 3 (1.33)
Application Framework 1 (2) 34 0 0 33 1 (1) 4 (1) 89 11 (1.545)
Native Library 1 (2) 38 0 0 38 1 (2) 1 (1) 180 6 (1)
Hardware Abstraction 3 (1.33) 101 0 0 98 6 (1.667) 4 (1) 131 2 (1)
Kernel 24 (1) 1 0 0 1 27 (1) 9 (1) 106 35 (1.6)
Table 4: Comparison of the vendors’ response times. S, L, and H represent Samsung, LG, and Huawei, respectively.
Delay Without Delay Already Included
Samsung 25 611 3
Huawei 4 173 10
LG 24 535 -
Table 5: Number of CVEs with AOSP Git reference by delay
status for different vendors.
delay from the Android security bulletin. In total, 825 CVEs have an
AOSP Git repository reference. Note that we restrict our analysis
to those CVEs that are only mentioned once in a vendor’s security
bulletins. According to Table 5, for most CVEs with an AOSP Git
repository reference, there is no delay in a vendor’s security bulletin
to mention a CVE.
3.4 Severity Level and Vulnerability Type
The time comparison of different vendors only represents one aspect
of how vendors manage their security bulletins. It is also worth
looking at the CVEs’ severity level (CVSS score) and delay. Figure 4
shows a cumulative histogram of CVSS score for different vendors
for CVEs with and without delay. Samsung performs better for
CVEs of high CVSS scores compared to LG. When there is no
delay, Samsung has more CVEs with a high CVSS score than LG.
On the other hand, in the presence of delay, we are observing a
higher number of CVEs with a high CVSS score in LG compared to
Samsung. Furthermore, Samsung has more CVEs with a high CVSS
score that have been already included compared to Huawei.
(a) Delay from Android (b) No delay (c) Already included
Figure 4: Distribution of CVSS scores for different vendors.
In addition to the CVSS score, we also study the Common Weak-
ness Enumeration (CWE), a standard for identifying the class of
software weakness, of CVEs in our dataset. A CWE ID has been
assigned to 92.9% of our dataset. Table 6 shows, for each vendor,
the top 10 CWE IDs by the number of CVEs for three different
categories, i.e., delayed CVEs, CVEs without delay, and “already
included” CVEs. CVEs with delay in both LG and Samsung have
the same top 10 CWE IDs with little changes in their order. This
is mostly true for CVEs without delay in these vendors with only
one difference (CWE ID 476 and CWE ID 399). But, we see a signif-
icant difference in Huawei in terms of both type and rank of CWE
IDs. One of the reasons for this is that the prevalence of CWE IDs
changes over time. For example, from December 2017, CWE ID 787
and CWE ID 264 correspond to around the same number of CVEs
(89 and 74, respectively). Second, as we see in Figure 2, Huawei
does not mention a considerable amount of CVEs in its security
bulletins (e.g., after December 2017, only 15.91% of CWE ID 284
have been mentioned in Huawei security bulletins).
4 DISCUSSION
Our work sheds light at the security practices of different vendors
in the Android ecosystem and it provides an important first step
for better security policy recommendations. Here, we summarize
some important takeaways from our study.
4.1 Security Bulletins Structure
Consider a case in which a CVE has been mentioned in the Android
security bulletins, but it has not appeared in a vendor’s security
bulletins. A security practitioner cannot infer whether this CVE
applies to the vendor’s Android device solely by looking at the
vendor’s security bulletins due to the possibility of delay in the
CVE announcement and the possibility that the vendor’s patch has
already included that CVE. As a result, we suggest that all vendors
follow Samsung and have a section that mentions which CVEs are
not applicable to their devices. Based on Section 3.2, we do not
have a bulletin reference for already included CVEs. It might be
better if a vendor can provide that information, enabling security
practitioners to associate CVEs to a patch correctly.
4.2 Public Repositories vs. SVE and LVE
As mentioned in Section 2, Samsung has SVE and LG has LVE. The
number of SVEs and LVEs are 295 and 63, respectively. For SVEs,
Samsung only provides severity, affected versions, reported date,
disclosure status, and description. For LVEs, LG provides the same
except the disclosure status. Both of these vendors do not provide
any corresponding CVE number for these SVEs and LVEs. However,
we have found the corresponding CVEs for some SVEs and LVEs
by manual search. But even with manual search, we cannot find
any corresponding CVEs for some of them. CVEDetails and NVD
database have been established via community effort to provide
a comprehensive database for anyone to facilitate vulnerability
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Samsung Huawei LG
CWE ID Weakness Summary Delay WO Delay Already Included Delay WO Delay Already Included Delay WO Delay
264 Access Control Error 233 (1) 213 (1) 37 (2) 4 (1) 36 (4) 9 (5) 336 (1) 191 (1)
119 Buffer Overflow 116 (2) 185 (2) 41 (1) 3 (2) 43 (3) 35 (1) 168 (2) 70 (4)
200 Information Disclosure 94 (3) 100 (3) 11 (5) - 16 (7) 5 (7) 124 (3) 88 (2)
284 Improper Access Conrol 49 (4) 89 (4) 12 (4) - - 3 (9) 69 (4) 83 (3)
20 Improper Input Validation 42 (5) 81 (5) 25 (3) - 23 (6) 10 (3) 62 (6) 50 (6)
416 Use After Free 38 (6) 19 (10) 6 (8) 1 (3) 27 (5) 10 (3) 66 (5) 15 (8)
125 Out of Band Reads 30 (7) 48 (7) - - 61 (2) 8 (6) 40 (8) 48 (7)
190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound 25 (8) 25 (8) 8 (7) 1 (3) 10 (8) 12 (2) 42 (7) 8 (9)
362 Race Condition 22 (9) - - - - - 29 (9) -
787 Out of Band Writes 12 (10) 70 (6) - - 69 (1) - 17 (10) 68 (5)
476 Null Pointer Dereference - 24 (9) 9 (6) - - 3 (9) - -
399 Resource Management Error - - - - - - - 8 (9)
400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption - - - - 7 (9) - - -
129 Improper Validation of Array Index - - 5 (9) - 6 (10) 4 (8) - -
191 Integer Underflow - - - - - 3 (9) - -
285 Improper Authorization - - 3 (10) - - - - -
Table 6: Top 10 CWE software weaknesses by the number of CVEs. WO denotes without delay. The number in parenthesis
shows that rank of a CWE on the corresponding category.
mitigation. As a result, we suggest that both Samsung and LG
provide CVEs for their corresponding SVEs and LVEs.
4.3 Inconsistency
In our previous work [12], we observed various inconsistencies
in Android security bulletins and CVEDetails. Further, there have
been recent efforts to find inconsistencies in public security re-
ports using natural language processing [9]. However, here, we
observe inconsistencies within a vendor. In Samsung, we observe
an inconsistency in terms of both severity level and whether a
CVE is applicable to Samsung devices. Note that these CVEs are
mentioned only once in Android security bulletins. For example,
CVE-2016-5342mentioned in Nov. 2016 with a high severity level is
mentioned again in July 2018 with a moderate severity level. More-
over, CVE-2014-9981 is mentioned in Oct. 2017 as not applicable
to Samsung devices. However, it again appears in February 2018 in
the in addition part. A vendor’s security bulletin is a reference point
for a security professional to check vulnerabilities. If there exists
inconsistency, this leaves a security professional with uncertainty.
Therefore, in addition to consistency among public repositories,
consistency within a vendor’s security bulletin is essential.
5 RELATEDWORK
Android Security and Software Updates. Research efforts on
the security of Android are immense and include a wide spectrum
(vulnerability finding, attack investigation, and secure infrastruc-
ture) [11, 31, 33, 34, 37]. Similar to other software, Android vendors
maintain the security of their devices by developing and issuing
patches regularly. Nappa et al. [27] studied the vulnerabilities life
cycle in client applications, and Li and Paxson [22] investigated
the patch development life cycle in open source software projects.
The issues of automatic updates and semi-automatic updates have
been investigated in [10] and [24], respectively. Farhang et al. [14]
differentiate between update and upgrade and study the upgrade
practices in the Windows operating system. Contrary to previous
work, we investigate the security practices of different vendors in
terms of vulnerability and patch management by gathering and
analyzing different vendors’ security bulletins.
Security Reports. Vulnerability reports and security bulletins
have been studied in different domains. In 2016, the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) started to study major mobile device ven-
dors’ security update practices [7, 8]. Arora et al. [5] showed that dis-
closure accelerates patch release. Bugs remediation can be improved
by interaction between software developers and bug reporters [6].
Security bugs that have been found by reputable professionals get
patched faster [16]. Missing information in vulnerability reports
endangers vulnerability reproduction [26]. Most closely to our work
are [23] and [12]. Linares-Vásquez et al. [23] studied CWE hierar-
chies, vulnerability types, Android layers affected by vulnerabilities
by collecting 660 Android-related vulnerabilities from Android se-
curity bulletins. Farhang et al. [12] not only conducted a similar
study with a more comprehensive dataset (2,470 Android-related
vulnerabilities), but also investigated new aspects like patching
vulnerabilities originating from Qualcomm and Linux. Here, we
study the commonalities and differences among vendors in the
Android ecosystem by collecting Android-related vulnerabilities
from different vendors, i.e., Samsung, LG, and Huawei.
6 CONCLUSION
We provided a comprehensive study of multiple Android vendors’
security bulletins to better understand how different vendors man-
age their security bulletins. By collecting 3,171 unique CVEs from
Android, Samsung, LG, and Huawei security bulletins, we investi-
gated bulletin management, delay related to Android stack layers,
and CWE ID in different layers. We found that (i) vendors have dif-
ferent structures for vulnerability reporting, (ii) Qualcomm-related
CVEs and the rest of external layers’ CVEs are handled differently
by vendors, (iii) the likelihood of delay for CVEs with Android Git
repository is low.
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